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O
ver the past two decades we have witnessed a remarkable turn-
around in the U.S. economy. The aftermath of the Vietnam
War and a series of oil shocks had left the United States with
high inflation, lackluster productivity growth, and a declining competi-
tive position in international markets. 
But rather than accept the role of a once-great, but diminishing eco-
nomic force, for reasons that will doubtless be debated for years to come,
we resurrected the dynamism of previous generations of Americans. A
wave of innovation across a broad range of technologies, combined with
considerable deregulation and a further lowering of barriers to trade, fos-
tered a pronounced expansion of competition and creative destruction. 
The result through the 1990s of all this seeming-heightened instabil-
ity for individual businesses, somewhat surprisingly, was an apparent
reduction in the volatility of output and in the frequency and amplitude
of business cycles for the macroeconomy. While the empirical evidence
on the importance of changes in the magnitude of the shocks impacting
on our economy remains ambiguous, it does appear that shocks are more
readily absorbed than in decades past. The massive drop in equity wealth
over the past two years, the sharp decline in capital investment, and the
tragic events of September 11 might reasonably have been expected to
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produce an immediate severe contraction in the U.S. economy. But this
did not occur. Economic imbalances in recent years apparently have
been addressed more expeditiously and effectively than in the past, aided
importantly by the more widespread availability and more intensive use
of real-time information. 
But faster adjustments imply a greater volatility in expected corpo-
rate earnings. Although direct estimates of investors’ expectations for
earnings are not readily available, indirect evidence does seem to
support an increased volatility in those expectations. Securities analysts’
expectations for long-term earnings growth, an assumed proxy for
investors’ expectations, were revised up significantly over the second
half of the 1990s and into 2000.1 Over that same period, risk spreads
on corporate bonds rose markedly on net, implying a rising probability
of default. Default, of course, is generally associated with negative earn-
ings. Hence, higher average expected earnings growth coupled with a
rising probability of default implies a greater variance of earnings expec-
tations, a consequence of a lengthened negative tail. Consistent with a
greater variability of earnings expectations, volatility of stock prices has
been elevated in recent years. 
The increased volatility of stock prices and the associated quicken-
ing of the adjustment process would also have been expected to be
accompanied by less volatility in real economic variables. And that does
appear to have been the case. That is, after all, the purpose of a
prompter response by businesses: to prevent severe imbalances from
developing at their firms, which in the aggregate can turn into deep
contractions if unchecked. 
As might be expected, accumulating signs of greater economic sta-
bility over the decade of the 1990s fostered an increased willingness on
the part of business managers and investors to take risks with both pos-
itive and negative consequences. Stock prices rose in response to the
greater propensity for risk-taking and to improved prospects for earn-
ings growth that reflected emerging evidence of an increased pace of
innovation. The associated decline in the cost of equity capital spurred
a pronounced rise in capital investment and productivity growth that
broadened impressively in the latter years of the 1990s. Stock prices rose
further, responding to the growing optimism about greater stability,
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But, as we indicated in congressional testimony in July 1999,2
“…productivity acceleration does not ensure that equity prices are not
overextended. There can be little doubt that if the nation’s productivity
growth has stepped up, the level of profits and their future potential
would be elevated. That prospect has supported higher stock prices.
The danger is that in these circumstances, an unwarranted, perhaps
euphoric, extension of recent developments can drive equity prices to
levels that are unsupportable even if risks in the future become rela-
tively small. Such straying above fundamentals could create problems
for our economy when the inevitable adjustment occurs.” 
Looking back on those years, it is evident that increased productiv-
ity growth imparted significant upward momentum to expectations of
earnings growth and, accordingly, to price-earnings ratios. Between
1995 and 2000, the price-earnings ratio of the S&P 500 rose from 15
to nearly 30. However, to attribute that increase entirely to revised earn-
ings expectations would require an upward revision to the growth of
real earnings of 2 full percentage points in perpetuity.3
Because the real riskless rate of return apparently did not change
much during that five-year period, anything short of such an extraor-
dinary permanent increase in the growth of structural productivity,
and thus earnings,4 implies a significant fall in real equity premiums in
those years. 
If all of the drop in equity premiums had resulted from a perma-
nent reduction in cyclical volatility, stock prices arguably could have
stabilized at their levels in the summer of 2000. That clearly did not
happen, indicating that stock prices, in fact, had risen to levels in excess
of any economically supportable base. Toward the end of that year,
expectations for long-term earnings growth began to turn down. At
about the same time, equity premiums apparently began to rise. 
The consequent reversal in stock prices that has occurred over the
past couple of years has been particularly pronounced in the high-tech
sectors of the economy. 
The investment boom in the late 1990s, initially spurred by signif-
icant advances in information technology, ultimately produced an
overhang of installed capacity. Even though demand for a number of
high-tech products was doubling or tripling annually, in many cases
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manufacturing industries rose more than 40 percent in 2000, well in
excess of its rapid rate of increase over the previous two years. In light of
the burgeoning supply, the pace of increased demand for the newer
technologies, though rapid, fell short of that needed to sustain the ele-
vated real rate of return for the whole of the high-tech capital stock.
Returns on the securities of high-tech firms ultimately collapsed, as did
capital investment. Similar, though less severe, adjustments were occur-
ring in many industries across our economy. 
Some decline in equity premiums in the latter part of the 1990s
almost surely would have been anticipated as the continuing absence of
any business correction reinforced notions of increased secular stability.
In such an environment, the relatively mild recession that we experi-
enced in 2001 might still have been expected to leave equity premiums
below their long-term averages. That apparently has not been the case,
as the tendency toward lower equity premiums created by a more stable
economy may have been offset to some extent recently by concerns
about the quality of corporate governance. 
The struggle to understand developments in the economy and
financial markets since the mid-1990s has been particularly challenging
for monetary policymakers. We were confronted with forces that none of
us had personally experienced. Aside from the then recent experience of
Japan, only history books and musty archives gave us clues to the appro-
priate stance for policy. We at the Federal Reserve considered a number
of issues related to asset bubbles—that is, surges in prices of assets to
unsustainable levels. As events evolved, we recognized that, despite our
suspicions, it was very difficult to definitively identify a bubble until after
the fact—that is, when its bursting confirmed its existence. 
Moreover, it was far from obvious that bubbles, even if identified
early, could be pre-empted short of the central bank inducing a sub-
stantial contraction in economic activity—the very outcome we would
be seeking to avoid. 
Prolonged periods of expansion promote a greater rational willing-
ness to take risks, a pattern very difficult to avert by a modest tightening
of monetary policy. In fact, our experience over the past fifteen years
suggests that monetary tightening that deflates stock prices without
depressing economic activity has often been associated with subsequent
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For example, stock prices rose following the completion of the
more than 300-basis-point rise in the federal funds rate in the twelve
months ending in February 1989. And during the year beginning in
February 1994, the Federal Reserve raised the federal funds target 300
basis points. Stock prices initially flattened, but as soon as that round of
tightening was completed, they resumed their marked upward advance.
From mid-1999 through May 2000, the federal funds rate was raised
150 basis points. However, equity price increases were largely unde-
terred during that period despite what now, in retrospect, was the
exhausted tail of a bull market.5
Such data suggest that nothing short of a sharp increase in short-
term rates that engenders a significant economic retrenchment is
sufficient to check a nascent bubble. The notion that a well-timed
incremental tightening could have been calibrated to prevent the late
1990s bubble is almost surely an illusion. 
Instead, we noted in the previously cited mid-1999 congressional
testimony the need to focus on policies “to mitigate the fallout when it
occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion.” 
It seems reasonable to generalize from our recent experience that
no low-risk, low-cost, incremental monetary tightening exists that can
reliably deflate a bubble. But is there some policy that can at least limit
the size of a bubble and, hence, its destructive fallout? From the evi-
dence to date, the answer appears to be no.6 But we do need to know
more about the behavior of equity premiums and bubbles and their
impact on economic activity.7
The equity premium, computed as the total expected return on
common stocks less that on riskless debt, prices the risk taken by
investors in purchasing equities rather than risk-free debt. It is a
measure largely of the risk aversion of investors, not that of corporate
managers. An increased appetite for risk by investors, for example, is
manifested by a shift in their willingness to hold equity in place of psy-
chologically less-stressful, but lower-yielding, debt. 
In this case, the cost of equity confronting corporate managers falls
relative to the cost of debt. With greater access to lower-cost equity,
managers are able to finance a higher proportion of riskier real assets
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Thus, it is generally the changing risk preferences of investors, not
of corporate managers, that govern the mix of risk investment in an
economy. Managers presumably employ market prices of debt and
equity coupled with the calculated rate of return on particular real
investment projects to determine the level of corporate investment. To
be sure, managers’ personal sense of risk aversion can sometimes influ-
ence the capital investment process, but it is probably a secondary effect
relative to the vagaries of investor psychology. 
Bubbles thus appear to primarily reflect exuberance on the part of
investors in pricing financial assets. If managers and investors perceived
the same degree of risk, and both correctly judged a sustainable rise in
profits stemming from new technology, for example, none of a rise in
stock prices would reflect a bubble. Bubbles appear to emerge when
investors either overestimate the sustainable rise in profits or unrealisti-
cally lower the rate of discount they apply to expected profits and
dividends. The distinction cannot readily be ascertained from market
prices. But the equity premium less the expected growth of dividends,
and presumed earnings, can be estimated as the dividend yield less the
real long-term interest rate on U.S. Treasuries.8
If equity premiums were redefined to include both the unrealistic
part of profit projections and the unsustainably low segment of dis-
count factors, and if we had associated measures of these concepts, we
could employ this measure to infer emerging bubbles. That is, if we
could substitute realistic projections of earnings and dividend growth,
perhaps based on structural productivity growth and the behavior of the
payout ratio, the residual equity premium might afford some evidence
of a developing bubble. Of course, if the central bank had access to this
information, so would private agents, rendering the development of
bubbles highly unlikely. 
Bubbles are often precipitated by perceptions of real improvements
in the productivity and underlying profitability of the corporate
economy. But as history attests, investors then too often exaggerate the
extent of the improvement in economic fundamentals. Human psy-
chology being what it is, bubbles tend to feed on themselves, and
booms in their later stages are often supported by implausible projec-
tions of potential demand. Stock prices and equity premiums are then
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Certainly, a bubble cannot persist indefinitely. Eventually, unrealistic
expectations of future earnings will be proven wrong. As this happens,
asset prices will gravitate back to levels that are in line with a sustainable
path for earnings. The continual pressing of reality on perception
inevitably disciplines the views of both investors and managers. 
As I noted earlier, the key policy question is: If low-cost, incremen-
tal policy tightening appears incapable of deflating bubbles, do other
options exist that can at least effectively limit the size of bubbles
without doing substantial damage in the process? To date, we have not
been able to identify such policies, though perhaps we or others may do
so in the future. 
It is by no means evident to us that we currently have—or will be
able to find—a measure of equity premiums or related indicators that
convincingly presage an emerging bubble. Short of such a measure, I
find it difficult to conceive of an adequate degree of central bank cer-
tainty to justify the scale of pre-emptive tightening that would likely be
necessary to neutralize a bubble. 
As we delve deeper into the questions raised by the developments of
recent years, the interplay between structural productivity growth and
equity premiums, so evident during the past business cycle, is bound to
play a prominent role. We need particularly to determine whether the
periodic emergence of market bubbles, which have occurred so often in
the past, is inevitable going forward. As financial wealth becomes an
ever-more-important determinant of activity, we need also to under-
stand far better how changing equity premiums affect and reflect real
and financial investment decisions. If the equity premium has so
demonstrable an influence on our economies as it appears to have, the
value of further investigation of this topic is evident. 
In conclusion, the endeavors of policymakers to stabilize our
economies require a functioning model of the way our economies
work. Increasingly, it appears that this model needs to embody move-
ments in equity premiums and the development of bubbles if it is to
explain history. 
Any useful model needs to credibly simulate counterfactual alterna-
tives. We must remember that structural models that do a poor job of
explaining history presumably also will provide an incomplete basis for
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employed to evaluate the effect of various stabilization policies. But the
results from models whose internal structure cannot successfully repli-
cate key features of cyclical behavior must be interpreted carefully. The
recent importance of movements in equity premiums and asset bubbles
suggests the need to better understand and integrate these concepts into
the models used for policy analysis. 
I anticipate productive discussion of these and other issues related
to stabilization policy over the next couple of days. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 13
ENDNOTES
1 These are earnings-weighted projections for S&P 500 corporations as
reported by securities analysts to I/B/E/S, a financial research firm. The roughly
twenty-year history of this series confirms a pronounced upward bias in these
long-term projections of analysts of approximately 4 to 5 percentage points in
annual expected growth. There is little evidence, however, one way or the other,
of bias to changes in the rate of growth. 
2 Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, July 22, 1999. 
3 For continuous discounting over an infinite horizon, k (E/P) = r + b—g,
where k equals the current, and assumed future, dividend payout ratio, E current
earnings, P the current stock price, r the riskless interest rate, b the equity pre-
mium, and g the growth rate of earnings. The relationship holds for both real and
nominal variables. If k is assumed to be 0.6, the average over the second half of
the 1990s (taking account of payouts made through share repurchases), a rise in
the P/E of the S&P 500 from 15 to 30, with r and b unchanged in real terms,
implies an increase in g of 0.02 in real terms. 
4 If earnings are a constant share of output in the long run, then real long-
term earnings growth is the product of productivity growth and growth in labor
force hours. In this exercise, the growth rate of hours, driven by demographics, is
assumed not to change; hence, the growth rates of earnings and productivity are
the same. 
5 Stock prices peaked in March 2000, but the market basically moved side-
ways until September of that year. 
6 Some have asserted that the Federal Reserve can deflate a stock-price bub-
ble—rather painlessly—by boosting margin requirements. The evidence suggests
otherwise. First, the amount of margin debt is small, having never amounted to
more than about 13/4 percent of the market value of equity; moreover, even this
figure overstates the amount of margin debt used to purchase stock, as such debt
also finances short-sales of equity and transactions in non-equity securities. Sec-
ond, investors need not rely on margin debt to take a leveraged position in equi-
ties. They can borrow from other sources to buy stock. Or, they can purchase
options, which will affect stock prices given the linkages across markets. 
Thus, not surprisingly, the preponderance of research suggests that changes
in margins are not an effective tool for reducing stock market volatility. It is pos-
sible that margin requirements inhibit very small investors whose access to other
forms of credit is limited. If so, the only effect of raised margin requirements is to
price out the very small investor without addressing the broader issue of stock
price bubbles. 
If a change in margin requirements were taken by investors as a signal that
the central bank would soon tighten monetary policy enough to burst a bubble,
then there might be the appearance of a causal effect. But it is the prospect of
monetary policy action, not the margin increase, that should be viewed as the
trigger. In a similar manner, history tells us that “jawboning” asset markets will be
ineffective unless backed by action. 14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
7 The sharp stock market contraction on October 19, 1987, of more than
one-fifth requires especial further study. Equity prices rose sharply during the
spring and summer, again despite the rise in short-term rates through late sum-
mer of that year. The price collapse clearly had some of the characteristics of pro-
longed and far larger bubbles, but stock prices quickly stabilized without
significant effect on economic activity. And, in line with later episodes, the failure
of the collapse to have an economic impact seems to have contributed to subse-
quent higher stock prices. 
8 From footnote 3, k(E/P) = D/P = r + b—g, where D is current dividends.
Hence, D/P—r = b—g. 